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Marriage is about commitment: future spouses typically say—among other 
things—to each other, and to the world, that they are willing to remain in a 
close relationship “for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness 
and in health.” That is, they declare that the survival of their relationship 
will not depend on whether the relationship will turn out to be convenient 
and that their marital intentions do not depend on their future life circum-
stances. Whether marriage vows are to be understood as a promise, as an 
attempt to promise, or as a mere statement of intention, they express the 
future spouses’ commitment to each other. Common sense usage links 
commitment with a promise to do something or an intention to be loyal to 
someone or something. Entering marriage with somebody usually involves 
all senses of commitment.
Many believe that marriage is the paradigmatic case of an attitudi-
nal commitment to another person or to a relationship. Throughout this 
essay I discuss (marital) commitment as being “to a relationship or to a 
person,” rather than settling for any of these. Philosophical literature on 
close relationship and love in general sometimes focuses on the value that 
a relationship has for an agent, and sometimes on the value that another 
person can have for an agent. There is clearly a difference between being 
committed to a relationship—and therefore being willing to do what it 
takes to protect that relationship and help it flourish—and being commit-
ted to a person—and therefore being willing to do what it takes to protect 
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that person and help her or him flourish. In happy circumstances the two 
sets of actions will coincide. I believe that the second attitude, rather than 
the first, reflects love; this may be contentious however, and therefore I do 
not try to adjudicate here whether love-based marital commitment is to 
relationships or to persons.
Of course, various people in non-marital relationships can be and are 
committed to each other. But marital relationships are different from 
other intimate relationships because they are assumed to be permanent 
and their purpose is comprehensive and not limited to a certain num-
ber of pre-established activities—some of the marital commitment is 
open-ended. Together, these features of marriage make marital com-
mitment a very high-level commitment and, therefore, a central case of 
commitment to persons or relationships. First, because marriage is not 
meant to be limited to a definite amount of time, the promise or inten-
tion to stay married is unusually demanding; friends, too, may hope that 
their friendship will endure, but the level of commitment in friendship 
is usually lower than in marriage. Second, marital commitment is very 
comprehensive: spouses typically share their lives with each other, rather 
than embark together on specific, and clearly delimited, projects. People 
engage in common long-term, even lifelong projects other than marriage 
(think for instance, of coworkers in domains from which one never really 
retires, such as subsistence agriculture or various crafts) but the scope 
of marriage is unusually broad. As long as it preserves permanency and 
comprehensiveness marriage remains a paradigmatic case of commitment 
even if one extends the definition of marriage beyond the usual require-
ments of heterosexuality and monogamy.
Intimates’ commitment to each other is usually assumed to be highly 
valuable and marital commitment enjoys special praise in most cultures; 
indeed, commitment is often considered to be the feature that makes mar-
riage admirable.1 Moreover, popular culture sometimes represents the 
value of marital commitment as a moral value, casting doubts on the char-
acter of spouses who break their marriages for trivial reasons—therefore 
indicating a lack of commitment—and even providing some pro tanto 
justification to the continuation of marriages that are otherwise morally 
objectionable such as, for instance, abusive or neglectful relationships. 
One reason why marital commitment is praised is that it is thought to indi-
cate the depth of the love for one’s spouse.
In this essay I aim to question these beliefs. I advance and give some 
support for two claims, one weaker and one stronger. Both claims unfold 
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against a background analysis of the general good of commitment, dis-
cussed in the second section. Much of this argument draws on Cheshire 
Calhoun’s analysis of commitment, which I discuss in the second sec-
tion. I hope to contribute to the discussion by taking Calhoun’s analysis 
further to suggest that, since commitment has no intrinsic value, and 
since it is by definition a form of cost, we must welcome situations 
when the goods to which commitment is usually instrumental can be 
realized in its absence.
The third section applies the previous section’s conclusion to the case of 
marital commitment. It explores the weaker claim: that we ought to praise 
marriage and marriage-like relationships only for the good they contain, 
and not for the fact that spouses are committed to each other. Commitment 
is only instrumentally valuable; it does not as such add any value to the 
relationship. Commitment has costs: it partially forecloses the future, and 
so it makes one less attentive and less open to life’s possibilities; therefore, 
it would be desirable for people to achieve the same goods without com-
mitment. If the marital goods achieved thanks to commitment—and which 
would be unachievable without it—are less important than the goods one 
foregoes by being committed, then the price of commitment is not worth 
paying. (As individuals who intentionally avoid commitments to relation-
ships or individuals must believe.)
The second, and more ambitious, suggestion—which I explore in the 
fourth section—is that commitment in general, and marital commitments 
in particular, are problematic instruments for securing the good of roman-
tic and sexual love. It makes sense to prefer that another person’s (per-
haps, especially romantic or sexual) love for you is sustained by their 
spontaneous inclination, rather than by their commitment.2 Moreover, the 
pragmatic reasons for commitment are weak when it comes to activities 
that, ideally, are process-oriented rather than goal-oriented—such as love 
for another person. Marriage and marriage-like relationships in particular 
depend on commitment in order to help individuals cope with the often 
tedious or irritating routines of shared everyday life. As much research 
suggests, this kind of routine is inimical to romantic and erotic love. 
Marital commitment may save the relationship and many of the goods it 
sustains, but it is unlikely to save romantic and erotic love.
The last section discusses some of the implications of my position for 
the goods of marriage and for the desirability of marriage reforms that 
aim to break the connection between marriage and permanence (such as 
temporary marriage) or between marriage and the comprehensive sharing 
of one’s life (such as minimal marriage).
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2. The Value and Costs of Attitudinal Commitments
Following Calhoun,3 I understand commitment in general to be a spe-
cies of intention. Agents who commit themselves intend to follow 
through on the object of commitment even under future circumstances 
that are such that, had the agents not been committed, it would be 
rational for them to revise their intention. Commitment, as discussed 
here, is active rather than passive, although in everyday language we 
sometimes refer to commitments that are not actively assumed (and 
even to unconscious commitments). One type of commitment is to the 
performance of particular acts, as in promises, contracts, and resolu-
tions. Another type is attitudinal commitments, that is a form of dedi-
cation to things that are very important to the agents’ sense of who 
they are and to their idea of what a good life is. Examples of the latter 
sense include normative commitments (that is, commitments to val-
ues), but also substantive commitments:  to hobbies, causes, persons 
and relationships, etc. Marriage most likely encompasses both kinds 
of commitments. Marriage itself is a contract: spouses-to-be promise 
each other future performances and they sometimes devise and enter 
specific marital contracts; and the everyday realities of married life 
contain numberless instances of promises and resolutions. But cer-
tainly what distinguishes marriage from other contractual relation-
ships is its attitudinal commitment component. Spouses typically see 
each other and their relationship as central to their idea of a good life, 
and, at least in love-based marriages, to their identity. It is the under-
lying attitudinal commitment that is supposed to support, and give 
meaning to, the commitment to the particular performances specified 
by the marriage contract (and often to the specific everyday promises 
spouses make to each other).
The value of making promises and entering into contracts is relatively 
straightforward: both are necessary for creating trust and legitimate expec-
tations, on which people’s well-being depends. They, unlike attitudinal 
commitments, are also not likely to be attributed intrinsic value or be mor-
alized. Therefore promises and contracts as such are not the subject of this 
essay, but in the end I will indicate how claims about the marital attitudinal 
commitments bear on what sorts of marital contracts ought to be available. 
Here I address the question of the value of substantive attitudinal commit-
ments in love-based marriages. Why is it important that people commit to 
those individuals and relationships that are central to their self-identity and 
to their beliefs about a good life?
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Before starting to address this question, I indicate one more feature of 
commitment: it comes in degrees, depending on how radical the change of 
circumstances must be in order to challenge the agent’s intention. At one 
end there is no commitment, but rather mere intentions, or very provisional 
plans: any new desire is a potential trigger for a cost-benefit re-evaluation 
of what one should do.4 Non-committed rational agents should be ready 
to revise their mere intentions or very provisional plans as soon as bet-
ter alternatives come along. An intention to have dinner at a particular 
location, for instance, may change as soon as a better possibility comes 
along. At the other extreme there is blind commitment, when a cost-benefit 
analysis of the intention that forms that commitment is off the table under 
any circumstances. Commitments can be so deep that agents are willing 
to hold on to them not only in spite of prudential reasons (when overall 
more convenient alternatives present themselves) but even in spite of value 
changes. Someone may be so deeply committed to a friend, for instance, 
that she will continue to remain loyal to the relationship or the person even 
if, over time, their moral values evolve and become incompatible.
As Calhoun herself notes, commitment enjoys popular praise; commit-
ted lives are believed to be better lives for the individual who lives them, 
and an ability to make commitments is usually considered the marker of 
maturity. Popular wisdom encourages individuals to commit themselves. 
But what is the value of commitment to the committed individual?
An obvious value of commitment is pragmatic, or instrumen-
tal. Given the limited resources of which individuals dispose, such as 
time and energy, commitment seems necessary for the achievement of 
non-immediate goals. In the pursuit of such goals better alternatives are 
likely to present themselves and the non-committed, or feebly committed, 
agent is likely to become distracted from the initial goal. But this seems to 
be an overly simplified picture. First, as Calhoun notes, better options do 
not always present themselves. Second, and more important, even when 
better options do appear, agents who have already invested significant 
time and effort in the pursuit of a goal tend to be reluctant to waste these 
resources and hop onto a new, more appealing, project. Even if I am not 
committed to learn German, but I merely intend to, discovering that I like 
Russian better will not necessarily convince me to change course. Since 
I  am well advanced with German (a language which turns out would 
not be the language of my first choice, should I make that choice now), 
I  will likely stick to it:  doing otherwise may mean that I  have wasted 
the resources that I  put so far into learning German. (Just as commit-
ment, mere intention may work by ignoring the so called ‘sunken costs 
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fallacy’—that is, by treating past investments as a reason to continue pur-
suing a goal even when changing course is more likely to yield better out-
comes for the agent.) Switching back to an understanding of commitment 
as the reluctance to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, we do not always 
need commitment in order to pursue long-term goals: often no new data 
comes up to challenge the initial cost-benefit assessment. In other cases 
past investment makes it irrational to change course mid-way. And when 
new options really are sufficiently attractive to outweigh one’s reluctance 
to waste past investment, it is not clear why it is rational not to change 
course midway and why commitment would be at all desirable.5
Perhaps, however, more should be made than Calhoun does of the fol-
lowing fact: commitment is often needed to achieve non-immediate goals 
not because without it we would change course and pursue other goals, but 
because in the pursuit of non-immediate goals we are likely to encounter 
significant adversity. Without commitment we might rarely if ever achieve 
non-immediate goals because of failures such as weakness of the will or 
mistakenly discounting the future, rather than due to an abundance of 
attractive opportunities. The frustrations of learning German may, in the 
absence of commitment, cause me to postpone my next assignment indefi-
nitely even while I recognize the irrationality of my behavior. And while 
procrastinating I may end up doing next to nothing rather than pursue an 
alternative, worthwhile goal such as learning Russian. Calhoun’s analysis 
of the pragmatic value of commitment touches on this point when she 
notes the popular belief that life without commitment may well turn into 
a life lived from moment to moment. But she does not pursue this thread 
to consider what, if anything, is wrong with such a life. For the remainder 
of this essay I shall leave to one side the question of whether living from 
moment to moment can be a valuable way of leading one’s life, if only 
one could afford to. (On a hedonistic view of well-being it probably is.) 
Instead, I concede that non-immediate goals are important to a good life 
and that most often commitment is necessary for attaining them. As I show 
in the next section, this consideration applies to the case of marital com-
mitment and is a plausible argument in favor of the instrumental value of 
commitment in marriage.
The second way in which commitment is usually said to be valuable is 
non-instrumental: many believe that commitment is constitutive of a good 
life because without commitment it is difficult to see in which way one’s 
self and one’s life can be said to be one’s own creations. Making attitu-
dinal commitments—to values, causes, individuals, and relationships—is 
the way in which we take an active stance in determining who we are and 
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what projects give meaning to our lives.6 However, as Calhoun argues, it is 
enough to have normative, rather than substantive, commitments, in order 
to ensure unified agency and life plans. Someone who lacks substantive 
commitments—that is commitments to particular people, relationships, or 
projects—can nevertheless be the author of their life in the sense usually 
employed by those who think that having a life plan is essential for a good 
human life. And some normative commitments—like deliberately seeking 
the satisfaction of one’s strongest desires—are in fact incompatible with 
substantive commitments.7
But how likely is it, in the first place, that the best lives are guided by 
a life plan? Some philosophers, such as Charles Larmore, draw on the 
European Romantic tradition to argue that the aspiration to exert control 
over the shape of one’s life, reflected by a life plan, is itself misguided. 
According to Larmore, the well-being “that life affords is less often the 
good we have reason to pursue than the good that befalls us unexpect-
edly”8 because “we are never in a position to grasp in advance the full 
character of our good, even in its broad outline.”9 In any case—whether or 
not having a life plan contributes to or diminishes one’s chances to a maxi-
mally good life—substantive attitudinal commitments, of which marital 
commitments are an example, do not seem necessary. Normative attitudi-
nal commitments are enough.
A last reason to believe that substantive attitudinal commitments are 
constitutive to a good life is that in the absence of such commitments one’s 
life is less likely to have meaning. It may be true that most of the things 
that give meaning to people’s lives are those to which they are usually 
committed. But commitment does not seem to be necessary for mean-
ing; being engaged with people and activities about which one cares is 
enough. Not all caring amounts to commitment, since not all caring is 
accompanied by an active intention to pursue what one cares about while 
making sure that the caring will continue in the future. One may instead 
care about projects, people, relationships, and causes—and derive mean-
ing from them—without dedicating oneself to them. Following Calhoun 
again, a person’s life can be meaningful because she spends enough time 
in the company of people she loves, pursuing causes she thinks are worthy 
and engaged in activities she finds valuable, even while thinking she might 
as well spend her time with other people she loves and doing other worthy 
things.
While substantive commitments may not be constitutive of a good 
life—because self-identity, life plans, and meaning are all possible with-
out them—they may however be indirectly instrumental to leading a 
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meaningful life. Most people may be better able to care for complex, rather 
than simple, activities and it is unlikely—for the reasons given above—to 
successfully pursue complex activities without some level of commitment. 
If so, then commitment is indirectly instrumental to meaningful lives, 
because without it individuals are less capable of successfully pursuing 
complex activities. If I am better able to care about activities which require 
that I exercise high levels of skill, commitment to acquiring skill will often 
be necessary if I am to have access to activities about which I care.
This consideration, however, does not apply with the same force to 
another source of meaning, human relationships. We typically do not 
need to master complex skills in order to pursue the relationships that we 
care about. Having good relationships may require dispositions such as 
attentiveness, respectfulness, communication skills, patience, or tolerance 
which can, to some extent, be learned; but one does not have to learn them 
within the particular relationship the pursuit of which one values. Perhaps 
a long history of practicing these dispositions in the past is helpful—or 
even necessary—for having a good relationship now. If so then at most 
one may need to be committed to cultivating good relationships in gen-
eral in order to be in a good position to have a good relationship with 
a particular person.10 This however doesn’t show that good relationships 
require substantive—as opposed to normative—commitments. Therefore, 
commitment to a person or relationship does not seem in any way neces-
sary in order to for the relationship to be meaningful. As I discuss in the 
next sections, commitment is often necessary to sustain marital relation-
ships over time but it seems particularly necessary when other kinds of 
motivation—like love—are insufficient to sustain the marriage.
Calhoun explains the attractiveness of the view that commitment is 
valuable by appeal to typical human psychology: many or most people 
seek familiarity and making commitments affords one more familiarity 
in how one relates to one’s future. Because being committed to some-
thing includes the intention to continue to be motivated by that thing’s 
value, commitment can function as a sort of roadmap. But in virtue of 
what makes it appealing, commitment is also a highly costly attitude for 
the committed individual. In order to sustain commitments, agents must 
foreclose certain future possibilities. Whoever wants to follow a map must 
refrain from roaming too far out of the mapped area: commitment has an 
inbuilt opportunity cost. In Calhoun’s own words, it
involves refraining from putting oneself in the way of temptation, refraining 
from cultivating activities, attitudes, and ways of life that are incompatible 
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with sustaining one’s commitment, repressing commitment-threatening 
emotions and desires, and resisting the live option of reconsidering the rea-
sons for having the commitment. That is, commitment entails readiness to 
engage in a set of refusals.11
On this account of commitment, part of its value is as an instrument to 
realizing long-term goals, and part of its value is its contribution to indi-
viduals’ well-being by responding to their need for familiarity. The latter 
source of value is also dependent on contingent (and by no means univer-
sal) psychological factors. But given the high opportunity cost involved 
in commitment, it seems that it would be desirable if people were less 
inclined to seek familiarity and therefore less reliant on commitment for 
their well-being. Calhoun notes that people are willing to pay the cost 
of foreclosing future opportunities in order to secure familiarity; but the 
foreclosing of opportunities is likely to also entail foreclosing one’s own 
development—in terms of experience, intellectual gains and, more gener-
ally, openness to the world. Hence, if personal development is itself desir-
able independent of one’s psychological inclinations, then it is regrettable 
that some such inclinations—like the desire for familiarity—can be satis-
fied only at the cost of limiting it. Less need for commitment would be 
desirable at least in cases when it is not in fact necessary for securing other 
goods—such as the acquisition of complex skills, the advancement of wor-
thy causes, and the cultivation of long-lasting good relationships—because 
individuals are sufficiently motivated by, say, curiosity or love.
The next section applies this analysis to the case of marital commitment.
3.  How Does Commitment Contribute to the Value 
of Marital Relationships?
An exceptionally popular TV miniseries from the 80s, The Thorn Birds, 
tells the story of the long-lasting love between a woman called Maggie 
and a man called Ralph. They first meet when Maggie is still a teenager. 
In spite of the mutual affection, attraction, and respect they feel for each 
other, they never become an established couple because Ralph is a Catholic 
priest. Yet, they remain in touch and throughout their long and winding 
lives occasionally reunite as lovers. Maggie and Ralph never marry each 
other because he chooses priesthood over family life; she not only regrets, 
but is also critical of his choice, yet does not sever her relationship with 
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him. The mutual love that unites them seems to be, until the end, stronger 
than her hurt for being rejected and his commitment to celibacy.
Maggie and Ralph are united in a lifelong romantic relationship that 
survives without them being committed to each other, and in spite of vari-
ous commitments that each of them has (Maggie marries another man). 
Stories of lifelong lovers who are kept together by love alone rather than 
by commitment abound (and many of them are about real, rather than fic-
tional, characters). I have chosen the fictional story of Maggie and Ralph 
because the narrative setup makes it clear that, in this case, commitment 
is least likely to have played any role in whatever goods their relationship 
realizes, including its longevity. They dedicate themselves neither to each 
other nor to their relationship, and they incur no contractual long-term 
obligations to each other. Therefore their relationship obviously lacks 
any kind of commitment. Some will think this kind of relationship is less 
desirable for this reason (and all other things equal). But others will find 
particular value precisely in the fact that some people succeed in having 
a long-term intimate relationship that endures entirely due to love. Here 
I will explore this latter possibility.
Maggie and Ralph’s love relationship is different from a usual love-based 
marriage in its lack of comprehensiveness: Maggie and Ralph do not share 
a household, do not raise children together, do not provide companionship, 
economic security, or social embedding for each other, and do not sup-
port each other in everyday small and large endeavors. Unlike most good 
marriages, in which mutual love is one of the several goods realized in the 
relationship, the relationship between Maggie and Ralph only realizes the 
good of mutual love. This may be an explanation of its endurance in spite 
of their lack of commitment to each other, or to their relationship.
By contrast, comprehensive relationships like marriage are less likely 
to endure in the absence of commitment. Commitment to one’s spouse is 
one way of ensuring a long-lasting, mutually supportive relationship. One 
reason why commitment is generally necessary for the endurance of many 
marriages is of the kind discussed by Calhoun in her general analysis of 
commitment: other, more attractive partners or valuable activities that are 
incompatible with partnered life may present themselves to spouses. In 
such cases commitment to one’s spouse or one’s marriage can prevent 
spouses from abandoning the marital relationship. But another, possibly 
more usual, reason why marriages often depend on commitment lies in 
the various adversities of comprehensively sharing one’s life with another. 
Even with no better alternatives in sight, it is difficult to interact with a 
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person, in your own home, (almost) every day and for a very extended 
period of time.
As I suggested in the previous section, the commitment expressed in 
the marriage vows indicates spouses’ reluctance to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis of their relationship, including a willingness to ignore the oppor-
tunity costs of continuing the relationship. To commit to a spouse means 
that one is unwilling to ponder whether being in the marital relationship 
is, on the whole, to one’s advantage. At least, one is unwilling to make the 
continuation of the relationship dependent on such analysis. Importantly, 
committed spouses do not compare their partners to other people with 
respect to how beneficial for them the relationship with their spouse is. 
Others may be more physically attractive, have more pleasant personali-
ties, make better parents, be wealthier, healthier, or a better personality fit 
than one’s own spouse; being committed means to disregard these facts as 
practical reasons for changing spouses.
Some instances of commitment to one’s spouse can be irrational—for 
instance, if one is married to a partner who is a particularly bad fit or with 
whom it is in fact unlikely that one will be able to realize those goods 
that one wishes to realize in one’s marriage.12 But marital commitment 
can be rational, and therefore instrumentally valuable if, in the longer run, 
it is likely to advance marital goods sought by the spouses. Many such 
goods—raising children well together with a partner, providing economic 
and emotional security and familiar companionship—are long-term goals 
and therefore unlikely to be realizable if one is (too) ready to change 
partners.
If commitment to one’s spouse has mere instrumental value, then it 
seems regrettable that we usually need commitment in order to sustain 
marital relationships. Like other attitudinal commitments, commitment to 
one’s spouse involves a type of “locking up the future.” By committing 
oneself, one rules out a number of future possibilities and this comes with 
epistemic, existential, and, in some cases, moral costs for the individual. 
The high costs of marital commitments are recognized even by its bold-
est defenders. This is how Brenda Almond, an advocate of old-fashioned 
marriages based on a very high degree of commitment (a type of marriage 
that rules out the availability of no-fault divorce) describes the opportu-
nity costs of commitment: “. . . marriage may mean the sacrifice of other 
friendships or other potentially enriching personal relationships.” She 
seems to agree with Calhoun on why it is worth it to pay the price of com-
mitment: “For many people, marriage remains an institution that provides 
some solidity for the project of building a coherent life plan.”13
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When the level of commitment to one’s spouse is extremely high, it can 
even entail that spouses are willing to continue their relationship in spite 
of very serious moral disagreement or even wrongdoing. If moral value 
trumps prudential value, commitment has overall disvalue in such cases.14
Commitment has instrumental value because it can secure the long-term 
continuation of the marital relationship and hence the realization of its 
long-term goods. But there is another kind of motivation that can ensure 
the same goal in the absence of commitment: lasting love. (The two kinds 
of motivation are, of course, not mutually exclusive.) As long as love, 
understood minimally as the inclination to seek another’s companion-
ship and advance her well-being, exists, commitment is not necessary. 
One need not be committed to one’s beloved in order to suspend any 
cost-benefit analysis of the relationship.15 The reason for this is that for 
someone who loves the beloved is not fungible. In spite of disagreement 
about the nature and reasons—if any—for love, the non-fungibility of the 
beloved is widely accepted.16 Therefore the appearance of more desir-
able partners will not be a reason to leave the marriage if one loves one’s 
spouse. And the various forms of adversity that one is likely to encounter 
in the course of married life can be weathered by love; people are often 
inclined to sacrifice their comfort and push their limits for the sake of their 
beloved or of their relationship with their beloved. It is likely that adver-
sity will test, or even erode love; indeed, in the next section I assume that 
sexual and romantic love, in particular, tend to be eroded by daily routine 
and hardship. Another kind of love, like that between friends, is likely to 
be more resilient. Even so, love alone cannot always secure the endurance 
of marriage over time—but neither can commitment, given that it, too, can 
be eroded.
As long as people love each other, commitment seems superfluous. 
Love and commitment are, of course, often to be found in one and the 
same marriage; a plausible explanation is that spouses seek to protect their 
love for each other with the help of commitment. Depending on what is the 
right theory of the nature and reasons of love, this may be a wise choice. 
In the next section, however, I will explore a pro tanto reason to doubt the 
attractiveness of committing in order to protect love—or at least its roman-
tic and sexual variety.
Marital commitment is necessary for the realization of marital goods 
precisely when romantic love is absent or insufficient. In such cases com-
mitment is instrumentally valuable because it advances other sorts of 
value such as the security brought by a long-lasting life companion and 
the ability to plan one’s life long-term with a partner. Yet, as already noted, 
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commitment to one’s spouse cannot be in itself morally praiseworthy. 
Commitment can and often is morally praiseworthy because it promotes 
moral goods—for instance, the protection of the more vulnerable indi-
vidual in a relationship. But commitment cannot be valuable above and 
beyond the value of that to which one is committed. This, in turn, means 
that in cases when the continuation of a relationship comes at a moral cost 
to the individual, appeals to commitment cannot redeem the relationship 
on moral grounds. Examples include abusive and neglectful relationships 
or cases when continuing one’s association with one spouse requires com-
plicity with morally reprehensible acts.
Therefore, the work done by commitment would be better done by love 
because, unlike commitment, romantic love has non-instrumental (as well 
as instrumental) value and because, as discussed above, commitment— 
even when rational and morally innocent—has costs. Love, too, has costs 
in terms of foreclosing future options and hence in terms of personal 
development—or else it would not be capable of sustaining relationships 
in the face of more attractive options. But, unlike in the case of commit-
ment, the value of love is not entirely dependent on the value of its object. 
Even when one loves a morally unworthy individual (and even when one 
ought, all things considered, to sever the relationship) loving has some 
value.17 A world where the goods of marriage were achieved without com-
mitment, out of love alone, would therefore be the better world; marital 
commitment seems to be a second-best solution to securing the goods of 
marriage.
Perhaps a love relationship like Maggie’s and Ralph’s could not be 
sustained as an everyday, more comprehensive relationship. To last, most 
marital relationships usually need commitment to smooth out the unavoid-
able disappointments and irritations of daily routine. (Although in the 
next section I suggest that marriage relationships that would fail to endure 
over time without commitment are likely to change in nature.) Conceding 
that most people need commitment to have lasting intimate relationships, 
would it not be wonderful if they did not?
4. Love for Another Person and Commitment
In the previous section I  suggested that love is a (preferable) alterna-
tive to commitment in cases when mere intentions cannot do enough to 
motivate spouses to stay in the marital relationship through tough times. 
Whatever one’s account of love and its reasons, the object of one’s love is 
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not fungible. This means that love can safeguard marriage against the first 
type of threat from which commitment, too, can protect it: the availabil-
ity of better partners. Love is also likely to shelter marriages against the 
second kind of threat, that of disheartening routine and other difficulties 
of ongoing company: love can motivate people to sacrifice their own con-
venience for the sake of the interests of the beloved or of the relationship 
with the beloved. But love itself may be lost, and one reason why people 
commit to each other and to their relationship is precisely in an attempt 
to ensure the endurance of their love. In this section I suggest why it may 
be inappropriate to see commitment as a wise means to securing the kind 
of romantic and sexual love that tends to drive contemporary marriage. In 
doing so I am aware that I rely on a controversial understanding of roman-
tic and sexual love—but which, I believe, is nevertheless very plausible.18
Whether or not it is possible to ensure that one will continue to feel 
romantic or sexual love for a particular individual, it is intelligible to pre-
fer to be loved out of spontaneous inclination, rather than because some-
one made a promise or a commitment, which is akin to a promise, to love 
you—and as a consequence they took the necessary steps to ensure that 
their love lasts. This thought is in fact ambivalent between a claim of fea-
sibility and one of desirability. Some believe that it is possible to control 
one’s behavior such that you keep alive—or perhaps rekindle—romantic 
or sexual love; for instance, by revisiting places where you have been 
happy with your beloved, or otherwise reminding yourself of the history 
of your love relationships.19 Others think it is impossible to control love 
for a particular individual to a sufficient extent to make one responsible 
for keeping it alive: individuals can achieve only so much success in their 
attempts to self-induce love for a particular individual.20 And some philos-
ophers believe that attempting to secure love with the help of commitment 
in particular is a self-defeating strategy because it allows spouses to take 
each other for granted which, in turn, undermines love.21 But of course, a 
likely reason to think one cannot fully control one’s love stems from the 
suspicion that part of what makes love so desirable cannot, by definition, 
be controlled.22 Here I draw on this latter thought.
Amartya Sen’s work on commitment (in a context unrelated to the dis-
cussion of intimate relationships) is helpful in clarifying the difference 
between being motivated by love and being motivated by commitment. He 
distinguishes between three kinds of motivation: self-interest, that is, aim-
ing to promote one’s welfare; sympathy, that is, aiming to promote a wider 
sense of welfare, in which the welfare of the agent is not independent from 
the welfare of the agent’s near and dear; and commitment, that is, a type of 
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motivation unrelated to the agent’s welfare (whether understood narrowly 
or broadly).23 Love is of the second kind: it seems uncontroversial that lov-
ing a person means, among other things, that one cares about the welfare of 
the beloved such that the lover’s well-being is dependent on the welfare of 
the beloved. Ideally, one prefers that one’s intimate relationships be driven 
by love rather than by commitment. The point holds for particular inter-
actions with those near and dear. As Michael Stocker’s famous example 
illustrates, we don’t want our friends to benefit us because they have a duty 
to do so (even if they do) but because they are genuinely partial towards 
us.24 But it may also hold in the case of love relationships as a whole: it 
seems more satisfying to be loved as a result of your lover’s spontaneous 
reaction to you rather than because they consciously remind themselves of 
the reasons they fell for you in the first place and do their best to keep their 
feelings alive. Similarly, it seems more satisfying to (continue to) love 
another independently from the history of your relationship—and believe 
that you would be inclined to love them if you now met them for the first 
time—and hence without the help of past commitments. The reason why it 
is better to love, and be loved, out of inclination so defined is that in such 
cases love is a direct reaction to the reality of the beloved.
The analysis so far is likely to apply beyond relationships, to many of 
the activities the success of which commitments can protect: it is better if 
my desire to learn Russian is independent from all the effort I have put so 
far into learning the language, that is if I wanted to start learning it were 
I  to encounter Russian for the first time today. But the value of learn-
ing languages, and of many other long-term processes in which people 
engage, derives, at least in part, from the successful attainment of a goal. 
I may derive a lot of value from the process of learning, but it is the final 
mastery of the language that makes for much of this endeavor’s worth. 
This is what makes learning a language an appropriate project. For this 
reason, committing to projects is generally prudent; choosing to live from 
moment to moment carries the risk that one will never enjoy the value of 
attained goals.
Yet, romantic love and sexual love are not obviously appropriately con-
ceived of as projects:  we love each other for the sake of loving, rather 
than for the sake of reaching a goal. The process may be all that there is 
valuable to (romantic and sexual) love. (This is not to deny that sexual and 
romantic love may be conducive to many valuable achievements.) This is 
a reason to believe that it is misguided to commit to feeling romantic or 
sexual love for someone even if it was conceptually coherent, and a likely 
successful strategy.25
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On this account, romantic and sexual love is at its best when the lovers 
are entirely focused on the moment and refrain from attempting to con-
trol the future of their relationship qua lovers. It is an understanding of 
love expressed by a popular (judging from its circulation in the electronic 
media) poem,26 which captures well the appeal of disentangling love from 
commitment:
After a while / you learn the subtle difference between holding a hand and 
chaining a soul / and you learn love doesn’t mean leaning and company 
doesn’t always mean security / And you begin to learn that kisses aren’t 
contracts and presents aren’t always promises.
The costs of commitment are, as I discussed in the previous section, mostly 
opportunity costs. Lack of commitment, too, has pragmatic costs: the likely 
sacrifice of reaching distant goals. But lack of commitment is costless in 
the case of activities that should be entirely process-oriented, that is, activ-
ities whose value is not dependent on agents accomplishing a certain goal 
which gives some of the meaning to the endeavor. Intimate relationships 
are most likely to be of this kind, activities whose aim, as they say, is 
the journey itself. Merely enjoying the company of another and allowing 
oneself to be changed by relating to another give value to intimate relation-
ships. For this reason, a lack of commitment is less costly when it comes to 
intimate relationships than in other contexts such as learning a language, 
pursuing a degree, or building a house.
Therefore, a person whom one loves, or even the relationship with 
that person, may be a particularly unsuited object of commitment, unless 
one has reasons independent of love to commit to that person. Such rea-
sons may be moral:  raising a child together towards whom the couple 
has already acquired parental duties, providing mutual aid, or pruden-
tial:  securing economic welfare, or pursuing various common projects. 
Indeed, partners in lasting marriage(-like) relationships tend to have such 
additional reasons to commit.
It is a welcome fact, then, that marriages typically contain a bundle 
of worthy goods. Should the above reflections be mistaken, and should 
there be nothing misguided in committing to love another, marriage and 
marriage-like—i.e. cohabiting—relationships would seem particularly 
ill-suited to preserve romantic and sexual love. As William Godwin, one of 
the first critics of love-based marriage, noticed a long time ago: “It is absurd 
to expect that the inclinations and wishes of two human beings should coin-
cide through any long period of time. To oblige them to act and to live 
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love, marriage, and philosophical lives together, is to subject them to some 
inevitable portion of thwarting, bickering and unhappiness.”27 If marriage 
is a worthy institution, it is so in virtue of its ability to realize other goods 
than romantic and sexual love.
5. Implications for Marriage Legislation
In this chapter I  suggested that the attitudinal commitment that gives 
meaning to the marriage institution has merely instrumental value. 
Commitment is good because it helps protect several goods realizable in 
marriage; I also suggested that it is unlikely that among the goods most 
appropriately protected by commitment to one’s spouse are romantic and 
erotic love. Moreover, commitment to one’s spouse can have very high 
opportunity costs. These considerations form a pro tanto reason to rethink 
the goals and duration of available forms of marriage—that is, to consider 
marriage reform.
The suggestions I have put forward regarding the value of marital com-
mitment give some support to several kinds of marriage reforms. The first 
kind is temporary marriage, making it possible for individuals to enter 
marital relationships without permanent commitment. The other kind is 
the fragmentation of marriage:  allowing individuals to split the various 
marital rights that currently are only available as a package between dif-
ferent individuals, thus making marital commitment less comprehensive. 
A reform that gets particular support from the argument of this essay is 
giving special legal protection to the family as a child-rearing institution, 
rather than to the family as a privileged relationship for the flourishing 
of romantic and sexual love. In the words of the legal scholar Martha 
Fineman, this would involve a move beyond the “sexual family.” Below is 
a more in-depth analysis of how my analysis of the value of commitment 
to one’s spouse indicates the desirability of these reforms.
The legalization of temporary marriage can be a way of recognizing 
that the opportunity costs of marriage are onerous. Of course, de facto 
temporary marriage already exists since divorce is legally available. Some 
critics of the liberalization of marriage deplore the fact that the availability 
of no-fault divorce has already eroded the possibility of the robust kind of 
marital commitment that was made by future spouses entering a traditional 
marriage.28 Contra conservatives, this essay indicted that the erosion of the 
extreme, blind kind of commitment required by marriage without divorce 
is good news. The existence and legitimacy of no-fault divorce constitute 
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a powerful argument in favor of making temporary marriage legally avail-
able. But divorce is often traumatic and costly. Therefore, it is plausible 
that temporary marriage is a superior option to the status quo of permanent 
marriage plus divorce. If the latter is legally available, so should be the 
former.29
Elizabeth Brake has recently argued, by appeal to the liberal ideal of 
state neutrality, that marriage should undertake a radical reform.30 Her pro-
posal is not restricted to permitting same-sex marriage, but extends to the 
number of marriages in which an individual may be involved by allowing 
a fragmentation of (some of the current) marriage rights. Individuals, on 
this account, ought to be free to engage in several minimal marriages, 
each centered on the protection of a different good—such as, for example, 
long-term companionship, or child-rearing, or economic security. Since 
states cannot legitimately protect controversial conceptions of the good, 
we ought, on Brake’s account, to eliminate the central role that romance 
and sex currently have in understanding marriage. However, marriage 
does have an important function which makes it worth preserving, albeit in 
a radically changed form: the protection of caring relationships. Because 
they are a precondition for individuals pursuing good lives, caring rela-
tionships are not, as such, part of any controversial conception of the good. 
But there is no reason for states to restrict the protection of caring rela-
tionships by bundling together the various rights that spouses currently 
enjoy in relationship with each other. The present analysis of commitment 
supports Brake’s proposal: if marriage relationships were fragmented, the 
content and value of each marital commitment would become clearer.
In particular, I suggested that, in spite of current legal and social expec-
tations, marriage (as cohabitation) may not in fact be particularly suited 
to cultivating love, especially romantic and sexual love.31 This claim 
supports another reformist proposal of rethinking the family by moving 
beyond the “sexual family”; Martha Fineman32 has argued that we should 
define the family as centered on care-giving for children rather than on 
the romantic and sexual relationship between spouses. This would entail 
an adjustment of policy goals and legislation, to give priority to the pro-
tection of the interests of the child and her main caregiver (rather than 
prioritize traditional arrangements in which children are reared by pro-
creating couples).
At least in the case of child-rearing, the intended span of marriage 
will be closely connected with its aims. In the past, several philoso-
phers have made proposals in line with all three points above when 
they suggested a bifurcation of the institution of marriage into marital 
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relationships established with the intention to raise children and marital 
relationships in which future spouses agree not to parent. Drawing on 
Margaret Mead’s work, Jeffrey Blustein argued that the first kind of mar-
riage ought to be permanent, while the second may be temporary and 
renewable. (Mead’s proposal is that marriages start as temporary and 
move on to the permanent, child-rearing phase once spouses are con-
fident they can sustain the relationship in order to protect the interests 
of their children.33) Both Mead’s and Blustein’s reasoning focuses on 
the interests of children as the main ground for such a reform. Without 
denying the importance of protecting children’s interest in marriage, the 
present essay supports a more general case for reforming marriage by 
appeal to the interest of the future spouses. By avoiding a moralizing 
stance on commitment it may be possible to think about, and reform, 
marriage in ways that should satisfy both conservatives concerned with 
the well-being of children and liberals who are also concerned with 
protecting the spouses’ well-being.34
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